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Abstract: 
We focus on a quantitative assessment of rigid labor markets in an environment of stable 
monetary policy. We ask how wages and labor market shocks feed into the inflation process 
and derive monetary policy implications. Towards that aim, we structurally model matching 
frictions and rigid wages in line with an optimizing rationale in a New Keynesian closed 
economy DSGE model. We estimate the model using Bayesian techniques for German data 
from the late 1970s to present. Given the pre-euro heterogeneity in wage bargaining we take 
this as the first-best approximation at hand for modelling monetary policy in the presence of 
labor market frictions in the current European regime. In our framework, we find that labor 
market structure is of prime importance for the evolution of the business cycle, and for 
monetary policy in particular. Yet shocks originating in the labor market itself may contain 
only limited information for the conduct of stabilization policy. 
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 Non-technical Summary
Employment is the most important factor of economic activity. The eﬃcient functioning of the la-
bor market, i.e. matching workers and employment opportunities, crucially determines the smooth
adjustment of economic activity to exogenous shocks. Hence, the labor market may be key for
understanding business cycle ﬂuctuations and for understanding the implications for monetary
policy in particular. In this light labor markets recently have received considerable interest in the
business cycle literature, see e.g. Hall (2005) and Shimer (2005), Trigari (2004) and Blanchard and
Gali (2005). Especially European labor markets tend to be characterized by high and prolonged
unemployment and inﬂexible wages. Against this background we quantitatively assess the role
which rigid labor markets play for conducting monetary policy in a stable European inﬂation
environment.
Our model reproduces key features of the data by including two prominent rigidities in the labor
market. First, ﬁrms may not be able to instantaneously ﬁnd new employees and, similarly, workers
have to search for jobs. Second, real wage rigidities hinder wage adjustments and shift the labor
market adjustment from prices to quantities. In the framework we propose, wages translate into
ﬁrms’ marginal costs which establishes a direct channel from wages to inﬂation dynamics via the
New Keynesian Phillips curve.
While some studies partially analyze the impact of labor market frictions and wage rigidities on
business cycle dynamics in New Keynesian models (see, e.g., Christoﬀel and Linzert, 2005, and
Braun, 2005) we proceed a step further by embedding above rigidities into a dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium (DSGE) model which we then estimate as a whole using Bayesian full infor-
mation techniques as in Smets and Wouters (2003). To circumvent the pre-euro heterogeneity
with respect to labor market institutions and monetary policy we base the estimation on German
time series. With this well-calibrated framework at hand we assess the role of the labor market
for the dynamics of the European economy and derive implications for monetary policy.
We ﬁrst use the estimated model to explore the question of how the labor market regime aﬀects the
transmission process of monetary policy. Adjustments in the labor market, e.g. the ﬂows in and
out of employment or the dynamics of real wages will aﬀect the overall transmission of monetary
1policy to inﬂation. The marginal cost of labor input is inﬂuenced, for example, by the degree of
nominal wage rigidity, the speed with which idle labor resources can be put to work and by the cost
of searching for workers. Firms’ marginal cost in turn determine their price setting behavior and
thus drive aggregate inﬂation dynamics. In this exercise we therefore consider diﬀerent degrees of
(real) wage rigidity and diﬀerent levels of labor market ﬂexibility.
Second we turn to examine how labor market shocks themselves inﬂuence business cycle dynamics.
In particular, we analyze how shocks in the labor market aﬀect the evolution of employment and
output on the one hand and inﬂation dynamics on the other hand. If indeed shocks originating
in the labor market were to strongly aﬀect production and prices, these shocks would constitute
valuable information for monetary stabilization policy. Third and ﬁnally, our study includes a
careful sensitivity analysis with respect to the way the wage rigidity is modelled.
Our results can be summarized as follows. First, we ﬁnd that the structure of the labor market
matters substantially for the overall behavior of the economy and the transmission of monetary
policy on inﬂation in particular. The speciﬁc settings of the labor market, as for example the
degree of wage inertia or the eﬃciency of the worker-ﬁrm matching process, are found to have
a notable impact. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that the degree of wage rigidity leads to more inﬂation
persistence. Moreover, if due to institutional reasons jobs are harder to ﬁnd, shocks to inﬂation
will die out more slowly. Furthermore we ﬁnd that a higher degree of wage rigidity ampliﬁes real
adjustment in the labor market implying stronger ﬂuctuations in employment.
Second, the realization of labor market shocks has an impact on the labor market itself but
a limited inﬂuence on the other blocks of the model economy. Therefore labor market shocks
do not contribute much to the cyclical dynamics of non-labor market variables – particularly
inﬂation. This suggests that the model does not feature much transmission from labor markets
to the rest of the economy. In our model, consumers perfectly insure each other against shortfalls
of consumption due to unemployment. Easing this assumption would likely introduce further
transmission. In addition, a further natural candidate for a change in the model structure is more
closely tying price setting decisions to decisions in the labor market like hiring and wage setting.
In total, to the extent the European Central Bank’s task is to keep inﬂation low (and stable),
2policy makers need to have a good understanding of the structure of the labor-market. The
realization of labor market speciﬁc shocks, however, to a ﬁrst (coarse) approximation does not
appear to contain much information for the conduct of monetary policy if its aim is to achieve
stable inﬂation and to stabilize output around its long-run trend.
Pointing to future research, this latter conclusion comes with the proviso that we leave aside one
important welfare-theoretic consideration: while labor market shocks may not alter actual output,
they can have a bearing on natural (ﬂex-price) or eﬃcient output, see e.g. Blanchard and Gali
(2005). This would in turn matter for the conduct of truly optimal monetary policy. We are
currently exploring this point in ongoing research.
31 Introduction
Employment is the most important factor of economic activity. The labor market is therefore
crucial for understanding business cycle ﬂuctuations and for understanding the implications for
monetary policy in particular. In this light labor markets recently have received considerable
interest in the business cycle literature, see e.g. Hall (2005) and Shimer (2005), Trigari (2004) and
Blanchard and Gali (2005). Especially European labor markets tend to be characterized by high
and prolonged unemployment and inﬂexible wages. Against this background we quantitatively
assess the role which rigid labor markets play for conducting monetary policy in a stable European
inﬂation environment.
Our model reproduces key features of the data by including two prominent rigidities in the la-
bor market. First, matching frictions produce equilibrium unemployment as in Mortensen and
Pissarides (1994). Second, real wage rigidities in the form of staggered right-to-manage wage bar-
gaining shift the labor market adjustment from prices to quantities.1 While some studies partially
analyze the impact of labor rigidities on business cycle dynamics in New Keynesian models (see,
e.g., Christoﬀel and Linzert, 2005, and Braun, 2005) we proceed a step further by embedding
above rigidities into a DSGE model which we then estimate using Bayesian full information tech-
niques as in Smets and Wouters (2003). With this well-calibrated framework at hand we assess
the role of the labor market for the dynamics of the European economy and derive implications
for monetary policy.
In this paper, we speciﬁcally aim to disentangle policy implications of the role of labor market
structure from the role of labor market shocks. We explore how monetary policy aﬀects aggre-
gate inﬂation dynamics in labor market regimes characterized by diﬀerent degrees of wage and
employment ﬂexibility. Using the results of the full information Bayesian estimation of the model
we also investigate how labor market shocks aﬀect business cycle dynamics and draw conclusions
for monetary policy.
1 The introduction of a wage rigidity into the matching framework follows the intuition of Hall (2005) and Shimer
(2004). Our approach contrasts with Gertler and Trigari (2005) in that we are able to retain the intensive margin
of employment.
4Our focus is explicitly on a quantitative analysis of rigid labor markets in an environment of a
stable monetary policy regime. To circumvent the pre-euro heterogeneity with respect to labor
market institutions and monetary policy we base the estimation on German time series. The
German economy serves as a particular well suited example for an economy with a rigid labor
market in an environment of a stable monetary policy regime.
We ﬁrst use the estimated model to explore the question of how the labor market regime aﬀects
the transmission process of monetary policy. Adjustments in the labor market, e.g. the ﬂows
in and out of employment or the dynamics of real wages will aﬀect the overall transmission of
monetary policy to inﬂation. The marginal cost of labor input is inﬂuenced, for example, by the
degree of nominal wage rigidity, the speed with which idle labor resources can be put to work and
by the cost of searching for workers. Firms’ marginal cost in turn determine their price setting
behavior and thus drive aggregate inﬂation dynamics via the New Keynesian Phillips curve. In
this exercise we therefore consider diﬀerent degrees of (real) wage rigidity and diﬀerent levels of
labor market ﬂexibility.
Second we turn to examine how labor market shocks themselves inﬂuence business cycle dynamics.
In particular, we analyze how shocks in the labor market aﬀect the evolution of employment and
output on the one hand and inﬂation dynamics on the other hand. If indeed shocks originating
in the labor market were to strongly aﬀect production and prices, these shocks would constitute
valuable information for monetary stabilization policy. Third and ﬁnally, our study includes a
careful sensitivity analysis with respect to the way the wage rigidity is modeled.
Our main results are summarized as follows. First and in line with the literature (e.g. Christoﬀel
and Linzert, 2005, and Trigari, 2004), the underlying structure of the labor market signiﬁcantly
aﬀects the transmission of monetary policy. In our framework, the right-to-manage wage bargain-
ing establishes a direct channel from wages to inﬂation. We can therefore show that the degree of
real wage rigidity is crucial for the dynamics of inﬂation after a monetary policy shock. This is
due to the fact that under The impact of the labor market structure on aggregate consumption
is, however, rather limited. Second, in our model labor market shocks are not decisive for the
dynamics of output and inﬂation at business cycle frequencies. Therefore, to a ﬁrst (and admit-
5tedly coarse) approximation monetary policy need not react to labor market speciﬁc shocks via its
interest rate rule.2 Third, our results do not seem to be sensitive to the particular way in which
we model the wage rigidity.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 lays out the theoretical model.
Section 3 shows the Bayesian calibration and priors for the following estimation. Estimation
results are given in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the results in terms of the interrelation of labor
markets and monetary policy transmission. Section 6 oﬀers conclusions and an outlook for further
research.
2 The Model
Our analysis builds on a New Keynesian framework augmented by Mortensen and Pissarides
(1994) type matching frictions in the labor market and with exogenous separation as in Trigari
(2006).3 We advance on her model extending it by a number of structural shocks in order to
describe the aggregate behaviour of the economy and by allowing for real wage rigidity. As is
common in the literature, we focus on a cashless limit economy; cp. Smets and Wouters (2003)
and large parts of Woodford (2003).
2.1 Households’ Consumption and Saving Decision
One-worker households are uniformly distributed on the unit interval and indexed by i ∈ (0,1).
They are inﬁnitely lived and seek to maximize expected lifetime utility by deciding on the level
(and intertemporal distribution) of consumption of a bundle of consumption goods, Ct(i), and by
2 In general, as stressed by Blanchard and Gali (2005), welfare-based conclusions regarding the optimal design of
monetary policy may depend very much on the interaction between real imperfections and shocks in the model.
In particular, while actual output may not be aﬀected by labor market shocks potential output – and thus the
welfare-relevant gap – could still change.
3 Separation rates in Germany are constant over the business cycle (see Bachmann, 2005, and the references
therein) – we therefore assume that each period a constant fraction of ﬁrm-worker relationships splits up for
reasons exogenous to the state of the economy. A similar argument for the U.S. is made by Hall (2005).
6holding pure discount bonds Bt(i),
max
{Ct(i),Bt(i)}
Et



∞  
j=0
βj
 
ǫ
pref
t+j U(Ct+j(i),Ct+j−1) − g(ht+j(i))
 



, β ∈ (0,1), (1)
subject to the budget constraint
Ct(i) +
Bt(i)
PtRt
= Dt + Bt−1(i)/Pt. (2)
Here Ct(i) marks consumption of the retail consumption bundle by agent i. Rt, which is assumed
to be the monetary authority’s policy instrument, denotes the gross nominal return on the bond.
Households own the ﬁrms in the economy, hence are entitled to their proﬁts. Following much
of the literature, we assume that households pool their income. There is perfect consumption
risk sharing. Dt denotes the income each household receives from (a) labor market activity, (b)
proﬁts of ﬁrms and (c) government transfers, such as unemployment beneﬁts minus lump-sum
taxation and payments under the income insurance scheme. Above, ǫ
pref
t is an i.i.d. shock to the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption. We refer to this shock as the demand
shock.
Let Ct−1 be the aggregate consumption level in period t−1. We assume that individual consump-
tion is subject to external habit persistence, indexed by parameter hc ∈ [0,1),
U(Ct(i),Ct−1) =
(Ct(i) − hcCt−1)1−σ
1 − σ
. (3)
As in Abel (1990) households therefore are concerned with “catching up with the Joneses”.4
The ﬁrst-order conditions can be summarized in the consumption Euler equation
λt = βEt
 
λt+1
Rt
Πt+1
 
, (4)
4 The speciﬁcation of the utility function is standard, see e.g. Smets and Wouters (2003). A minor modiﬁcation
of the utility function that yields the same ﬁrst-order approximation to the Euler equation apart from the
deﬁnition of the shock process is U(Ct(i),Ct−1) =
1
1−σCt(i)
1−σC
σh
t−1. In this case λt = ǫ
pref
t C
−σ
t C
σh
t−1. A similar
speciﬁcation can be found in Fuhrer (2000). Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (2001) argue that the ability of
general equilibrium models to ﬁt the equity premium and other asset market statistics is greatly improved by
the presence of external habit formation in preferences.
7where λt = ǫ
pref
t (Ct − hc Ct−1)−σ marks marginal utility of consumption and Πt is the gross
inﬂation rate.5
To complete the description of preferences, disutility of work is characterized by
g(ht(i)) = κh,t
ht(i)1+φ
1 + φ
, φ > 0, κh,t > 0. (5)
Here, κh,t denotes a serially correlated shock to the disutility of work:
log(κh,t) = log(κh)(1 − ρκh) + ρκh log(κh,t−1) +  
κh
t , 0 < ρκh < 1,
where  
κh
t is an i.i.d. innovation.
2.2 Production
New Keynesian models assume that prices are costly to adjust and that ﬁrms behave optimally
conditional on the given cost structure. This leads to diﬀerent ﬁrms in the economy having diﬀerent
prices and hence facing diﬀerent demand. Following the literature (see e.g. Trigari, 2006), in order
to avoid complications we part the markup pricing decision from the labor demand decision. For
an application which operates with ﬁrm-speciﬁc labor and a matching market in the price setting
sector, see Kuester (2006).
There are three types of ﬁrms. Intermediate good producing ﬁrms need to ﬁnd a worker in order
to produce. In this sector labor market matching and bargaining occurs. Once a ﬁrm and a worker
have met, wages are negotiated and ﬁrms take hours worked as their sole input to production.
Intermediate goods are homogenous. The goods are sold to a wholesale sector in a perfectly
competitive market at real price xt. Firms in the wholesale sector take only intermediate goods
as input, and diﬀerentiate those. Subject to price setting impediments ` a la Calvo (1983), they sell
to a ﬁnal retail sector under monopolistic competition. Retailers bundle diﬀerentiated goods to a
consumption basket Ct and under perfect competition sell this ﬁnal good to consumers at price
5 Due to consumption insurance and separability of utility in consumption and hours worked, all households in
equilibrium will have the same consumption levels. We therefore suppress index i wherever the index is not
necessary for the context.
8Pt. We next turn to a detailed description of the respective sectors.
2.2.1 Intermediate Goods Producers
There is an inﬁnite number of potential intermediate goods producers. Intermediate goods are ho-
mogenous. Firms in production are symmetric one-worker ﬁrms. Before entering production, ﬁrms
currently out of production have to decide whether they want to incur a real search cost/vacancy
posting cost to stand a chance of recruiting a worker. This cost is labeled κt/λt > 0.6 We assume
that vacancy posting costs follow an autoregressive process
log(κt) = log(κ)(1 − ρκ) + ρκ log(κt−1) +  κ
t , 0 < ρκ < 1,
where  κ
t is an i.i.d. innovation. Let Vt be the market value of a prototypical ﬁrm out-of-production
in t and Jt the value of a ﬁrm in t that already found a worker prior to period t,7 then
Vt = −
κt
λt
+ Et {βt,t+1qt(1 − ρ)Jt+1}. (6)
Here qt denotes the probability of ﬁnding a worker in t and ρ is the constant probability that a
match is severed for an exogenous reason prior to production in t+1. βt,t+1 := β
λt+1
λt denotes the
equilibrium pricing kernel.8
Labor (hours worked) is the only factor of production. Each ﬁrm j in the intermediate good sector
has the same production technology with decreasing returns to labor
yI
t(j) = ztht(j)α, α ∈ (0,1). (7)
Here yI
t(j) marks the amount of the homogenous intermediate good produced by ﬁrm j and zt
6 Since marginal utility of consumption, λt tends to be low in booms and high in recessions, this speciﬁcation
implies procyclical real vacancy posting costs.
7 Wherever it is clear from the context that variables refer to a speciﬁc ﬁrm/worker match, as it should be here,
we do not index variables by j.
8 In principle, in period t ﬁrms that found a worker prior to period t decide whether to produce or not to produce.
Our assumption that separation is exogenous means that we abstract from such considerations. However, we
retain the point of no production as our threat point in the wage bargaining process. Implicitly therefore we
assume that in equilibrium the bargaining set will always be non-empty.
9marks the economy wide level of productivity. Intermediate goods producers sell their product in
a competitive market at real (in terms of the ﬁnal good) price xt. Labor is paid the real hourly
wage rate wt. So the value as of period t of a ﬁrm, the worker-match of which is not severed prior
to production, is given by
Jt = ψt + Et {βt,t+1 [(1 − ρ)Jt+1 + ρVt+1]}, (8)
where ψt is the ﬁrm’s real per period proﬁt which will be discussed in detail in equation (18).
Vacancy Posting. We assume that there is free entry into production apart from the sunk
vacancy posting cost. This insures that ex ante (pre-production) proﬁts are driven to zero in
equilibrium, Vt = 0. Together with (6) and (8) this implies the vacancy posting condition
κt
λt
= qtEt
 
βt,t+1(1 − ρ)
 
ψt+1 +
κt+1
λt+1qt+1
  
. (9)
Iterating equation (9) forward shows that real vacancy posting costs in equilibrium equal the
discounted expected proﬁt of the ﬁrm over the life-time of a match.
Matching. We assume a standard Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) type matching market. Let
ut be the fraction of workers (households) searching for employment during period t, let vt be the
number of vacancies posted in period t as a fraction of the labor force. Firms and workers meet
randomly. In each period the number of new matches is assumed to be given by the following
constant returns to scale matching function
mt = σmu
σ2
t v
1−σ2
t , σ2 ∈ (0,1), (10)
where σm > 0 can be understood as the eﬃciency of matching, which is the rate at which ﬁrms and
workers meet. σ2 governs the relative weight the pool of searching workers and ﬁrms, respectively,
receive in the matching process. We deﬁne labor market tightness (from the view point of a ﬁrm)
10as
θt :=
vt
ut
. (11)
The probability that a vacant job will be ﬁlled,
qt :=
mt
vt
= σmθ
−σ2
t , (12)
is falling in market tightness, showing the congestion externality of new vacancies. The probability
that a searching worker ﬁnds a job,
st :=
mt
ut
= σmθ
1−σ2
t , (13)
in turn is increasing in market tightness. Each new searcher decreases market tightness and
therefore means a negative labor market tightness externality to other workers searching for em-
ployment.
Wage Bargaining Preliminaries. Firms and workers bargain only over wages, taking the ﬁrm’s
labor-demand function as given (“Right-to-manage”). Christoﬀel and Linzert (2005) demonstrate
that in a right-to-manage wage bargaining framework wage persistence may contribute to explain
a large part of the observed inﬂation persistence. This channel is missing under the predominantly
used assumption of an eﬃcient bargaining model. We turn to describe each party’s surplus from
staying matched, which is an integral component of each side’s bargaining position. A ﬁrm which
stays in production receives a period proﬁt ψt in t. With probability 1−ρ the current match will
not be severed at the beginning of the next period. Due to free entry into vacancy posting, the
value of not being matched is always zero. A ﬁrm’s surplus therefore is
Jt − Vt = ψt + Et {βt,t+1(1 − ρ)Jt+1}. (14)
An unemployed worker receives real beneﬁts b. With probability st he will ﬁnd a new ﬁrm.
Conditional on having found a ﬁrm, with probability (1−ρ) this match will survive until production
11starts. The value of a worker who is not employed but searching during t therefore is
Ut = b + Et {βt,t+1[st(1 − ρ)Wt+1 + (1 − st + stρ)Ut+1]}, (15)
Taking into account the consumption equivalent value of the disutility of work,
g(ht)
λt , the value to
the worker when employed during period t and not searching is
Wt = wtht −
g(ht)
λt
+ Et {βt,t+1[(1 − ρ)Wt+1 + ρUt+1]}, (16)
reﬂecting the probability of being separated in t + 1 with probability ρ. Hence the marginal
increase of family utility through an additional family member in employment, the surplus of
being in employment in t, is given by9
Wt − Ut = wtht −
g(ht)
λt
− b + Et {βt,t+1(1 − ρ)(1 − st)(Wt+1 − Ut+1)}. (17)
Real Wage Rigidities. Once matched, each period ﬁrms and workers negotiate over the real
wage rate subject to adjustment costs which need to be born by the ﬁrm. A ﬁrm’s per period
proﬁt is deﬁned as
ψt(j) := xtyI
t(j) − wt(j)ht(j) −
1
2
φL (wt(j) − wt−1(j))
2 , (18)
where xt is the real price of the intermediate good, yI
t(j) is the ﬁrm’s production level, wt(j)
is the prevailing wage rate at ﬁrm j and wt−1(j) is last period’s ﬁrm-speciﬁc wage level (or the
average wage level if there is no wage history).10 Apart from the direct eﬀect on proﬁts, this
speciﬁcation implicitly assumes that ﬁrms perceive real wage changes to bring about additional,
9 This can be derived from ﬁrst principles by assuming that workers value their labor-market actions in terms of
the contribution these actions give to the utility of the family to which they belong and with which they pool
their income; see Trigari (2006).
10 We also experimented with nominal (instead of real) wage adjustment costs and with a Calvo-type staggered
wage setting mechanism. Qualitatively, our results are not aﬀected by this choice. See Appendices F and F for
details.
12unambigously negative eﬀects on proﬁts. For example, real wage decreases may be detrimental to
worker motivation today. By the same token, real wage increases today on the other hand can be
hard to reverse in the future. Parameter φL > 0 indexes how strong this motive is.11
With right-to-manage, labor demand is given by the competitive optimality condition that the
marginal value product of labor, xt mplt, needs to equal the hourly real wage rate:
xtmplt = wt, where mplt := ztαhα−1
t . (19)
Wage Bargaining, Final Ingredients. Firms and workers seek to maximise the overall rents
arising from an existing employment relationship. These rents are distributed according to the
bargaining power of workers, η. Firms and workers, once matched, negotiate so as to maximize
their weighted joint surplus by a state-contingent choice of the real wage rate:
max
{wt(j)}
(Wt(j) − Ut(j))η (Jt(j) − Vt(j))1−η. (20)
The corresponding ﬁrst order condition is
ηJt(j)
∂[Wt(j) − Ut(j)]
∂wt(j)
      
:=δ
W,w
t (j)
= −
∂[Jt(j)]
∂wt(j)
      
:=δ
F,w
t (j)
(1 − η)(Wt(j) − Ut(j)). (21)
Since all ﬁrms are identical and each ﬁrm resets its wage every period, we can drop individual
ﬁrm-worker pair indeces. The terms in (21) are
δ
F,w
t = ht + φL
 
(wt − wt−1) + β(1 − ρ)(wt+1|t − wt)
 
, and
δ
W,w
t =
ht
α − 1
 
α −
mrst
wt
 
, where mrst =
κh,th
φ
t
λt
is a worker’s marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure.
11 In our model, there is no beneﬁcial motive for ﬁxed wages. In particular, in some circumstances both workers
and ﬁrms could be made better oﬀ by removing the real wage adjustment costs. We leave a more detailed
exploration for future research.
13Labour Market Flows. Let nt be the measure of employed workers at the beginning of period t,
before production takes place. A constant fraction ρ of these are laid oﬀ just before work starts in
t and immediately join the pool of workers searching for a new job. The pool of workers searching
during t therefore is:
ut = 1 − (1 − ρ)nt. (22)
The measure of newly matched workers, mt, join the pool of employed workers in t+1, therefore
aggregate employment evolves according to
nt = (1 − ρ)nt−1 + mt−1. (23)
Here nt measures the beginning of period employment before job separation occurs and before
production takes place.12 Note that thereby the measure of workers which actually produce in
period t is (1 − ρ)nt. This closes our description of the labor market and the intermediate good
producing sector.
2.2.2 Wholesale Sector
Firms in the wholesale sector are distributed on the unit interval and indexed by l ∈ (0,1). The
homogenous intermediate good (see Section 2.2.1) is the only input into wholesale production,
being traded in a competitive market for real price xt per unit. Wholesale ﬁrms produce a
diﬀerentiated good yt(l) according to
yt(l) = yI
t(l), (24)
where yI
t(l) denotes wholesale ﬁrm i’s demand for the homogeneous intermediate good. Due to
the linearity of the production function, xt coincides with wholesale ﬁrms’ marginal cost. The
typical ﬁrm sells its diﬀerentiated output in a monopolistically competitive market at nominal
price pt(l). We follow Calvo (1983) in assuming that in each period a random fraction ϕ ∈ (0,1)
of ﬁrms cannot reoptimize their price. Following Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) and
Smets and Wouters (2003), we assume that ﬁrms which cannot reoptimize their prices (partially)
12 End of period employment, say ˜ nt = (1−ρ)nt, evolves according to: ˜ nt = (1−ρ)˜ nt−1 +(1−ρ)mt−1. This may
look more familiar to some readers.
14index to the realized inﬂation rate. The degree of indexation is measured by parameter γp ∈ (0,1).
Wholesale ﬁrms face the demand function:
yt(l) =
 
pt(l)
Pt
 −ǫ
cp
t
yt, ǫ
cp
t > 1, (25)
where Pt is the economy wide price index and yt is an aggregate index of demand. The cost-push
shock is modelled as a time-varying (own-price) elasticity of demand, ǫ
cp
t . We assume that there
are (cost-push) shocks,  
cp
t , to the elasticity of demand,
log(ǫ
cp
t ) = log(ǫcp) +  
cp
t ,
which are i.i.d. over time.
Wholesale ﬁrms which reoptimize their price in period t face the problem of maximizing the value
of their enterprise by choosing their sales price pt(l) taking into account the pricing frictions and
their demand function:
max
pt(l)
Et



∞  
j=0
ϕjβt,t+j
 
pt(l)
Pt+j
j−1  
k=0
 
Π
γp
t+kΠ
1−γp
 
− xt+j
 
yt+j(l)



, (26)
where Πt+k is the quarter on quarter gross inﬂation rate (from one quarter before to t+k) and Π
marks the quarterly gross inﬂation rate in steady state. Their ﬁrst order condition is:
Et



∞  
j=0
ϕj
pβt,t+j
 
pt(l)
Pt+j
(1 − ǫ
cp
t+j)
j−1  
k=0
 
Π
γp
t+kΠ
1−γp
 
+ ǫ
cp
t+jxt+j
 
yt+j(l)



= 0. (27)
Linearizing this ﬁrst-order condition results in a standard New Keynesian Phillips curve. We turn
to the ﬁnal goods sector.
2.2.3 Retail Firms
Retail ﬁrms operate in perfectly competitive product markets. They buy diﬀerentiated wholesale
goods and arrange them into a representative basket, producing the ﬁnal consumption bundle yt
15according to
yt =
   1
0
yt(l)
ǫcp
t −1
ǫcp
t dl
  ǫcp
t
ǫcp
t −1
. (28)
The cost-minimizing expenditure to produce one unit of the ﬁnal consumption bundle is
Pt =
   1
0
pt(l)1−ǫ
cp
t dl
  1
1−ǫcp
t . (29)
Note that Pt coincides with the consumer price index.
Closing the representation of production, market clearing in the markets for all goods requires
that13
yt = (1 − ut)yI
t = (1 − ut)zthα
t = Ct. (30)
Before we close the model by a description of monetary policy, we want to emphasize the role that
our labor market characterization plays in the economy.
2.3 The Wage-Inﬂation Channel in the Linearized Model
In order to arrive at an empirically tractable version of the model, we linearize above equations
around a zero-inﬂation, constant production steady state. While we defer a complete presentation
of the linearized model to Appendix A, this section explains the determinants of aggregrate wages
and the transmission from wages to inﬂation in our model. “Hats” denote percentage deviations
from steady state while “bars” mark steady state values.
Equation (21) implicitly deﬁnes the “wage equation”. While in its non-linear form the equation
due to the wage adjustment costs cannot be brought into an accessible format, a lot can be learned
from a linearized version. The wage equation (once linearized) can be rewritten as
  wt = γ1   mrst + γ2
 
  κt −   λt +   θt
 
− (γ2 + γ3)  ht + ξ3  χt − ξ2
 
  χt+1|t −   χt
 
. (31)
13 Here we use that wholesale production is linear in intermediate goods and that all intermediate goods ﬁrms have
the same production level.
16Here
  χt =   δt
W,w
−   δt
F,w
=
\  
∂
∂wt
{η(Wt − Ut) + (1 − η)(Jt − Vt)}
 
,
where the ﬁnal “hat” refers to the percentage deviation of the entire term in square brackets from
steady state.   χt can consequently be interpreted as the approximate eﬀect of a wage increase in
a particular ﬁrm on total bargaining surplus of the ﬁrm-worker match. This leads to an intuitive
interpretation of wage equation (31): Ceteris paribus the real wage rate will be the higher, the
larger the worker’s marginal rate of substitution of leisure for consumption, i.e. the less willing
he is to work an additional instant of time.14 In addition, the wage rate will increase with rising
real vacancy posting costs (  κt −   λt) since these imply larger rents which can be extracted from
the ﬁrm-worker relationship. A similar reasoning is valid for an increase in market tightness, θt.
Decreasing returns to labor mean that additional hours worked will turn ever less productive. The
third factor might be interpreted to reﬂect this feature. The real wage rate will also be the higher
the more total surplus increases with an increase in the wage (the   χt factor). Finally, whenever
  χt+1|t −   χt is positive, wage increases in the future are expected to have a more positive (less
negative) eﬀect on future total surplus than current wage increases have on the current surplus.
This leads ﬁrms and workers to defer wage increases to a certain extent and, consequently, exerts
a dampening eﬀect on wages.
As regards the real wage rigidity, the eﬀect of a marginal wage increase on total surplus,   χt, can
be decomposed as
  χt =
mrs
w
mrs
w − α
(  mrst −   wt) − φL
w
h
 
(  wt −   wt−1) − β(1 − ρ)
 
  wt+1|t −   wt
  
.
Thus the upward pressure on wages is increasing in the gap between the worker’s subjective price
of work and the market remuneration.15 In terms of wage rigidity, whenever φL > 0, the term
14 As to the sign of parameters,
ξ3 =
χ
1 −
χ
α
￿
1
α
+
κθ
λwh
−
mrs
w(1 + φ)
−
b
wh
￿
.
This is strictly positive in our calibration. All the other parameters in (31) are strictly positive by deﬁnition
(see Appendix A).
15 This assumes that
mrs
w − α > 0, which is the case in our calibration.
17  wt−   wt−1 dampens both wage increases and wage reductions. This is done by increasing the total
surplus from wage increases whenever there is a tendency to lower the wage rate and by reducing
this eﬀect whenever wage increases are imminent.
Wages in our model translate into inﬂation by increasing the cost of the intermediate good, xt,
via the intermediate good producer optimality condition (19), which translates into
  xt =   wt −
 
  zt + (α − 1)  ht
 
.
Ceteris paribus, for the wholesale sector an increase in marginal cost, xt, through an increase in
real wages means an increase in inﬂation,   πt, via the New Keynesian Phillips curve
  πt =
β
1 + βγp
Et  πt+1 +
γp
1 + βγp
  πt−1 +
(1 − ϕ)(1 − ϕβ)
ϕ(1 + βγp)
(  xt +   et),
where   et reﬂects the cost-push shock.16 All else equal, the impact of wages on marginal cost will
be the larger the less pronounced inﬂation indexation (the closer γp to zero) and the larger the
fraction of wholesale ﬁrms allowed to update prices each period (the smaller ϕ).
2.4 Monetary Policy
The monetary authority is assumed to control the nominal one-period risk-free interest rate Rt.
The empirical literature (see, e.g. Clarida, Gali, and Gertler, 1998 and 2000) ﬁnds that simple
linearized generalized Taylor-type rules of the type
  Rt = ρm   Rt−1 + (1 − ρm)γπEt
 
  πt+1 −   πt
 
+ (1 − ρm)γy  yt, (32)
represent a good representation of monetary policy. All parameters are non-negative. These rules
state that the central bank sets interest rates in response to expected deviations of inﬂation from
target Et
 
  πt+1 −   πt
 
and in response to the output gap   yt.17 In addition the central smoothes
16 The Phillips curve is standard (see e.g. Smets and Wouters, 2003) and can be obtained by linearizing (27).
17 The output gap here is the percentage deviation of output from trend output. Potential output varies over
the cycle and is hard to measure in real time. The deviation of output from trend thus is informationally less
18interest rates.
We allow for a serially correlated inﬂation target shock
log(Πt) = (1 − ρ)log(Π) + ρlog(Πt−1) +  Π
t ,
where  Π
t is an i.i.d. shock.
3 Calibration and Priors
The literature has recently seen a surge of activity in estimating dynamic stochastic general equi-
librium (DSGE) models by means of full information Bayesian techniques; see e.g. Schorfheide
(2000), Smets and Wouters (2003), del Negro, Schorfheide, Smets, and Wouters (2004) and Lu-
bik and Schorfheide (2005). The advantage of full information relative to limited information
techniques is that model estimates will provide a complete characterization of the data gener-
ating process. In a Bayesian framework, through the prior density prior information (derived
from earlier studies, from outside evidence or personal judgement) can be brought to bear on the
estimation process in a consistent and transparent manner.
The decision of how much weight to place on diﬀerent sources of prior information in the presence
of possible identiﬁcation problems ultimately depends on the goal of the analysis. We seek to
strike a compromise in our calibration. We estimate those parameters which we think are most
important for the problem at hand and ﬁx the other parameters on the basis of outside evidence
and estimates in the literature.
Fixed Parameters. We now turn to our calibration for the constant parameters.
• Elasticity of demand: ǫcp = 11. Once the elasticity of output with respect to hours worked,
α, is ﬁxed, the elasticity multiplies only the markup shock. It is therefore indistinguishable
from the standard deviation of the markup shock. We set the own price elasticity of demand
to 11, a value implying a markup of 10% in the wholesale sector as in Trigari (2004) and
demanding than the deviation of output from potential.
19many other papers.
• Labor share: share=0.72. In steady state under right-to-manage the labor share is given
by18
share =
ǫcp − 1
ǫcp α.
With an empirical estimate for the labor share and a calibration for ǫcp, a value for α results.
In our closed economy we decide to take the share of wage income in national income as the
corresponding measure of share. Using our calibration for ǫcp = 11 this implies α = 0.792.
• Discount factor: β = 0.99. This is the inverse of the mean ex-post real rate in our sample.
• Labor supply elasticity: φ = 10. The elasticity of intertemporal substitution of labor, 1/φ,
is small in most microeconomic studies (between 0 and 0.5). We follow the lead of Trigari
(2004).
• Risk aversion: σ = 1. We decide to use log-utility as is the prior mean in Smets and Wouters
(2003).
• Separation rate: ρ = 0.08. This is slightly higher than suggested by the evidence in Burda
and Wyplosz (1994) accounting for the immediate separations of new matches prior to any
production in our model. The latter feature in our model (i.e. “unsuccessful job interviews”)
is not reﬂected by the worker ﬂow data.
• Searching workers: u = 0.15. In the data the mean ratio of employed persons to total labor
force is 0.925. Taking the value for the separation rate of ρ = 0.08 from above, we arrive
at a mean fraction of searching workers of u = 1 − (1 − ¯ ρ)n = 0.149. The value of u is
large in comparison with the oﬃcial unemployment rate. In the model, however, u is the
pool of searching workers and should encompass workers who are not included in the oﬃcial
unemployment rate but searching for work (e.g., discouraged workers). For a thorough
discussion see Yashiv (2006).
18 The labor share is share =
(1−ρ)nwh
(1−ρ)nzhα = xα, which uses xαzh
α−1 = w and y = (1−ρ)nzh
α. With x =
ǫcp−1
ǫcp the
desired expression follows.
20• Vacancies: v = 0.1. The number of vacancies empirically is hard to observe. We set the
steady state number of vacancies to 2
3 times the number of searching workers. This ensures
that ﬁrms rather quickly ﬁnd new workers, while workers have a harder time to ﬁnd jobs.
• η = 0.2. η is a key determinant of the share of wages in total surplus (yet not in proﬁts) and
hence a determinant between the gap between unemployment beneﬁt and wage income. We
calibrate the bargaining power parameter so as to achieve a reasonable replacement rate,
  b
wh = 0.5
 
. In line with the recent literature, a relatively low bargaining power of workers
results.
• No serial correlation of the cost-push and the preference (consumption demand) shock. Ab-
stracting from serial correlation in the cost-push shock is standard in the literature; see
e.g. Smets and Wouters (2003). Wherever possible our prior is to use economic theory to
explain the data instead of using serial correlation in shock processes. In our model, the
preference shock will strongly drive consumption. We therefore cannot identify whether the
autoregressive pattern in consumption results from an autocorrelated consumption prefer-
ence shock or from habit persistence in consumption. Following the guidance of economic
theory we let habit persistence explain consumption persistence. On top, this also ensures
the typical hump-shaped response of consumption/output to a monetary policy shock.
• Summing up, these values imply a steady-state probability of ﬁnding a worker of q = 0.74.
The probability of ﬁnding a job is s = 0.5. This implies that an average unemployment
spell lasts for 2 quarters. Our calibration also implies that structural obstructions to hir-
ing/setting up a ﬁrm account for roughly one and a half quarters of production, captured
by real vacancy posting costs κ/λy = 1.5.19
Table 1 summarizes the values of the ﬁxed parameters.
19 The large value of vacancy posting costs is needed to oﬀset the considerable ex post/per period proﬁts in the
intermediate goods sector originating from the decreasing returns to scale in production. Note that κh is not
needed in order to estimate the model and ﬁx the steady state ratios.
21Table 1: Fixed Parameters
Parameter ǫcp α β φ σ ρ u v η
Value 11 0.792 0.99 10 1 0.08 0.15 0.1 0.2
Notes: values of parameters which are kept ﬁxed in the subsequent estimation.
Priors for Estimated Parameters. We opt to model priors for almost all parameters as nor-
mally distributed with tight enough prior standard deviations and truncated to reﬂect the support
considerations where necessary. We follow the literature in modelling the standard deviation of
innovations as inverse-gamma with fat tails as we lack prior information on those variances. We
assume that all marginal priors are independent.
• Priors for the Taylor rule. As in Taylor’s (1993) original suggestion for the U.S., we set the
mean of γπ to 1.5 and the mean of γy to 0.5/4.20 We allow for wide standard deviations of
0.3 for both parameters. Woodford, among others, has repeatedly emphasized that inertia
is a property of optimal monetary policy (see e.g. Woodford, 2003). We set a prior mean for
the indexation parameter, ρm, to 0.75 and a standard deviation of 0.05. These values are
very similar to those estimated by Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1998) on German data.21
• Habit persistence, hc. Consumption habit has a prior mean of 0.85, which is higher than the
value of roughly 0.5 commonly found in the literature (cp. e.g. Smets and Wouters, 2003).
In Smets and Wouters (2003) yet, for instance, the autocorrelation of the preference shock
(estimated to be 0.9) is allowed to partly take the burden of explaining the serial correlation
of consumption.
• Price stickiness, ϕ. Our prior mean of 0.9 assumes that 10% of ﬁrms update their prices
each quarter, which is the posterior mode estimate of Smets and Wouters (2003) for the euro
area. The implication that prices are sticky for an average of 10 quarters is tenable for the
20 We deviate from Taylor’s (1993) suggestion by modelling the response to inﬂation as being preemptive, and in
modelling interest rate inertia.
21 They use monthly data from 1979 to 1993 and estimate
b rt = 0.75
b rt−1 + (1 − 0.75)
￿
1.31/4Et
￿
b π
yoy
t+4
￿
+ 0.25/4
b yt
￿
,
where
b π
yoy
t :=
b πt +
b πt−1 +
b πt−2 +
b πt−3 marks annual (year-on-year) inﬂation. The persistence coeﬃcient is
adjusted (ρ = 0.91
3) to match our quarterly frequency.
22German economy. See Hoﬀmann and Kurz-Kim (2004) for evidence.We impose a standard
deviation of 0.05.
• Price indexation, γp. Our model allows for persistent marginal costs through persistent
technology shocks and additionally through persistence of wages. We therefore set mean
price indexation to the rather small value of 0.3. This is in line with the euro area evidence
reported in Gali, Gertler, and L´ opez-Salido (2001). For comparison, Smets and Wouters
(2003) estimate a posterior mode value of 0.4 which given their prior corresponds to a value
more than two standard deviations below their prior mean. We allow for a wide standard
deviation of 0.1 in order to accommodate other values of γp.
• Weight on the number of job-seekers in matching, σ2. We set a mean of 0.4 and take a
prior standard deviation of 0.05. Burda and Wyplosz (1994) estimate a value of σ2 = 0.68.
The lower value in our calibration reﬂects our prior that in the last decade in Germany the
unemployment rate will not have been the main driving force behind new matches.
• Wage indexation, φnew
L . The mean value of 0.25 was chosen on the basis of prior experimen-
tation with the model. To the best of our knowledge no independent evidence exists that
would help to set this parameter. We allow for a (in our view and experience) wide standard
deviation of 0.1 on our prior.
Next we turn to our priors for the serial correlation of the shocks, which are important for deter-
mining the system’s dynamics. Some of the serial correlation parameters are at the boundary of
values suggested in the literature. This is largely due to our modelling strategy that we try to
be as parsimonious as possible with respect to introducing shocks. We see this as a virtue of our
approach.
• Shock to inﬂation target, ρeπ. We choose a prior mean of 0.3. Smets and Wouters (2003)
allow for two “monetary policy shocks”: one persistent shock to the inﬂation target and
additionally one serially uncorrelated innovation. Our prior tries to strike a compromise but
allows for a wide standard deviation of 0.2.
23• Shock to vacancy posting costs, ρeκ. We set a mean of 0.7. Vacancy posting costs are a
catch-all for impediments to setting up ﬁrms/hiring workers. As such, our prior dictates
that these ought to be persistent. We choose a prior standard deviation of 0.1.
• Technology shock: ρez. We impose a prior mean of 0.9 for the technology shock that is in
line with the values conventionally used in the RBC literature for quarterly data. We set a
standard deviation of 0.025.
• Shock to disutility of work: ρeκh. This shock will loosen the connection between the very
persistent technology shock and wages. Smets and Wouters (2003) assume that labor supply
shocks themselves are very persistent. However, they on top of this also introduce an iid
“wage mark-up shock”. Economically, a prior mean of 0.3 on the serial correlation of the
disutility of work shock is reasonable. We allow for a standard deviation of 0.1 in our prior.
• Cost-push and demand preference shocks are assumed to be i.i.d.
All priors for the standard deviations follow inverse gamma distributions. The exception being
the innovation to the disutility of work shock: there we use a tighter normal prior to explicitly
restrict the support of this innovation.
Observable Variables. Much of the recent debate in the labor market literature (see e.g. Hall,
2005, and Shimer, 2005) has focused on the variability of vacancies. Hall (2005), in an eﬃcient
bargaining framework, shows that if the labor share is suﬃciently large and the wage bill does
not ﬂuctuate much, proﬁts (and the proﬁt share) ﬂuctuate considerably. This in turn induces
the number of vacancies to ﬂuctuate as much as in the data – a fact the matching model had
been criticized of not being able to match. In a right-to-manage framework, up to ﬁrst order,
the labor share is determined by technology, not by bargaining power (and, besides, is constant
over time). We therefore are not able to exactly match the volatility of vacancies in the data.
As emphasized by Christoﬀel and Linzert (2005), however, right-to-manage bargaining introduces
a direct channel from wages to inﬂation. We weigh the advantages of both bargaining schemes
and decide to pursue right-to-manage here. Consequently we do not treat vacancies as a variable
which we want to match in our estimation.
24Hours worked are imprecisely measured in the German national statistics. The speciﬁc choice of
the time-series for hours would have inﬂuenced our results to a considerable extent with not much
theoretical guidance for the choice of a particular series of the many which are available. We
therefore decide not to treat hours worked as one of our observable variables but to limit ourselves
to ﬁtting the time-series of consumption, employment, real wages, (consumer price) inﬂation and
nominal interest rates.
4 Estimation Results
In our empirical study, we employ quarterly German data from 1977:1 to 2004:2; see Appendix
B for details on the sources and properties of the data. Thirty of these observations are used for
presampling so that the observation sample starts in 1984:3.
Table 2 shows our estimates of the posterior mode for the model parameters. Further estimation
statistics (posterior mean, median and coverage intervals) are delegated to Appendix C, Table
10. The Taylor rule estimates are in line with the evidence by Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1998).
Our estimate of habit persistence, hc = 0.83, is still somewhat larger than usually found in the
literature but below our prior mean. This may be attributed to the fact that we do not allow
for serially correlated demand shocks. This Calvo probability, ϕ = 0.92, is larger than the prior
mean. The degree of stickiness seems to be too high, even in light of German micro pricing
studies. Bringing this estimate down to reasonable numbers recently has been the scope of a
growing literature; see Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Linde (2005), Eichenbaum and Fisher
(2003) and Kuester (2006), for instance. We ﬁnd a low degree of price indexation, γp = 0.26.
Finally, the weight on unemployment in the matching process is estimated to be well below half,
σ2 = 0.31. New matches in the German data according to our model estimates are driven by
vacancies rather than by the pool of unemployed workers in contrast to the estimates of Burda
and Wyplosz (1994) until 1991.
Turning to shock persistence, our results seem in line with the literature. Worth mentioning is
that labor market friction shocks (vacancy posting shocks) are estimated to be less persistent than
the prior mean, ρκ = 0.6. The innovation to the disutility of work,  κh, does not match well with
25Table 2: Estimated Parameters at the Posterior Mode
Parameter prior posterior “t-stat”
mean std distr. mode std
Parameters of Structural Model
ρm 0.750 0.0500 norm 0.7852 0.0347 22.6258
γπ 1.500 0.3000 norm 1.4020 0.2396 5.8514
γy 0.125 0.3000 norm 0.1907 0.0579 3.2915
hc 0.850 0.0500 norm 0.8295 0.0324 25.5776
ϕ 0.900 0.0500 norm 0.9242 0.0138 67.1596
γp 0.300 0.1000 norm 0.2638 0.0691 3.8164
σ2 0.400 0.0500 norm 0.3113 0.0505 6.1666
φnew
L 0.250 0.1000 norm 0.3622 0.0515 7.0392
Serial Correlation of Shocks
ρ¯ π 0.300 0.2000 norm 0.3554 0.0982 3.6178
ρκ 0.700 0.1000 norm 0.5973 0.0630 9.4833
ρz 0.900 0.0250 norm 0.9339 0.0251 37.1918
ρκh 0.300 0.1000 norm 0.2040 0.0845 2.4139
Standard Deviation of Innovations
 ¯ π 0.007 Inf invg 0.0028 0.0006 4.8168
 pref 0.100 Inf invg 0.0683 0.0130 5.2528
 z 0.006 Inf invg 0.0042 0.0012 3.6615
 cost−push 0.001 Inf invg 0.0029 0.0003 11.1078
 κ 0.010 Inf invg 0.0253 0.0062 4.1023
 κh 0.200 0.1000 norm 0.4350 0.0564 7.7181
Notes: Estimates of the posterior mode. The standard deviation is obtained by a
Gaussian approximation at the posterior mode. “t-stat” refers to the mode estimate
divided by the posterior marginal standard deviation. Nota bene: The underlying
calibration is such that q = 0.7391, s = 0.4928, wh/y = α = 0.72, κ/
￿
λy
￿
= 1.4771,
b/
￿
wh
￿
= 0.5, u = 0.15 and v = 0.1. We deﬁne φ
new
L =
w
h φL/1000 for better
readability.
26the prior. Its posterior value is 0.44, well above its prior mean. The remaining posterior mode
estimates of innovation standard deviation appear to be reasonable.
As a measure of matching data properties, Table 3 reports how well the standard deviations of
the endogenous variables in our model match with the time-series evidence. To that aim, we
Table 3: Model Second Moments Relative to Data
Variable RMSE (model) RMSE (VAR) std (model) std (data) std (VAR)
  yt 1.09 0.96 1.67 1.73 1.66
  rt 0.09 0.08 0.36 0.44 0.37
  πann
t 0.37 0.40 1.47 1.32 1.10
  nt 0.43 0.38 0.85 1.09 1.03
  wt 0.62 0.58 2.39 2.23 1.65
Notes: All entries have been multiplied by 100. The table compares the root mean squared
forecast error of the model evaluated at the posterior mode (second column) to the root mean
squared forecast errors resulting from a VAR(2) in the sample 1984:3 - 2004:2 (third column).
The fourth to sixth column compare the standard deviations implied by the model to those taken
directly from the data and those taken from an auxiliary VAR(2). Nota bene: standard deviation
of hours (very dependent on the choice of the data series): 0.0210 (model) vs. 0.05328(data);
standard deviation of vacancies: 0.0817 (model) vs. 0.3016(data).
compare the model standard deviations to those taken directly from the data and to those taken
from an auxiliary VAR(2) model. Overall, our model seems to ﬁt the second moments of the data
rather well. When it comes to comparing root mean squared forecast errors, only the consumption
equation falls behind a VAR(2) in terms of forecast performance. That the model explains the
data well is corroborated also by the marginal data densities displayed in Table 4 with the model
consistently outperforming Bayesian VARs. Marginal data densities are used to judge the posterior
odds of one model against another. We assess our structural model against VARs with ﬂat priors.
The larger the marginal data density of our model relative to the benchmark VAR, the better the
posterior odds for our structural model; see e.g. Lubik and Schorfheide (2005) for an accessible
exposition.
Table 4: Log Marginal Data Densities
BVAR(1) BVAR(2) Model
true Laplace true Laplace Laplace Harm. Mean
1586.43 1585.66 1576.32 1574.25 1609.83 1609.86
Notes: Marginal data density of Bayesian VARs with one and two lags under
ﬂat priors, using the Laplace approximation and the exact formula each. The
model marginal data density is computed using the Laplace approximation and
the modiﬁed harmonic mean.
27Table 5 illustrates that the persistence of real wages and inﬂation implied by the model is very
similar to the persistence found in the data (compare also Table 8 in Appendix E).
Table 5: Persistence Measures
Variable β1 β1 + β2 β1 + ... + β3 β1 + ... + β4 β1 + ... + β5
  wt 0.94 (0.93) 0.92 (0.92) 0.92 (0.91) 0.92 (0.93) 0.92 (0.92)
  πann
t 0.93 (0.93) 0.90 (0.92) 0.89 (0.91) 0.89 (0.89) 0.93 (0.91)
Notes: Shown is the sum of up to the ﬁrst ﬁve regression coeﬃcients when regressing the
relevant variable on its own lags (evaluated at the posterior mode). Regression coeﬃcients
are based on the estimated model at the posterior mode. In brackets are the values measured
in the data.
We delegate a further measure of ﬁt to Appendix D: Figure 7 in that appendix reports model
cross-correlations and compares those to the cross-correlations measured in the data. By and large,
we conclude, the model does a good job at ﬁtting the data. We next turn to the propagation
mechanism of shocks and ultimately to the policy considerations.
5 The Labor Market and the Dynamics of the Economy
In this section, we analyze the dynamics of the estimated model. Towards that aim, we present
empirical impulse response functions as well as forecast error variance decompositions. In particu-
lar, we investigate the speciﬁc role of the labor market for the model’s dynamics. Additionally, we
will present counterfactual scenarios illustrating the dynamics of the economy in diﬀerent labor
market regimes.
In a ﬁrst step, we are particularly interested in how a monetary policy shock is transmitted in the
presence of a rigid non-Walrasian labor market. An increase in the inﬂation target in our model
corresponds to the central bank decreasing its key interest rate (see the solid line in Figure 1). The
lowered rate reduces savings and increases household consumption. The increased demand in turn
requires additional labor input. Due to the rigidities in the labor market the number of employed
workers cannot be increased instantly.22 Hence labor adjustment is initially implemented via an
increase of hours worked per employee. In the following, for brevity the term “proﬁts” refers
22 Although this would be beneﬁcial from a welfare perspective due to decreasing returns to labor.
28only to proﬁts in the intermediate goods sector, i.e. in the sector where all labor market activity
takes place. With “proﬁts” we mean the value of period proﬁts current and future accruing to a
single ﬁrm which operates in the intermediate goods sector in t. We thus use the term “proﬁts”
as synonymous to “market value of a ﬁrm in the intermediate goods sector” in t, denoted by Jt
in equation (8). We explicitly denote by “period proﬁts” the period proﬁts of a single ﬁrm in
t, labelled ψt in equation (18). The rise in demand following the increase of the inﬂation target
boosts expected proﬁts. Vacancy posting increases until expected proﬁts equal the posting costs.
In anticipation of higher proﬁts the value of an employment relation increases and workers aspire
higher wages. Firms’ marginal cost of production increase with higher wage rates implying higher
prices and higher inﬂation (see Figure 1).
Figure 1 also shows a counterfactual exercise illustrating the eﬀect of wage rigidity.23 We compare
the response to an inﬂation target shock in the estimated model with the response in a model
assuming ﬂexible wages.24 In the right-to-manage wage bargaining model, period proﬁts and
wages are tightly positively linked, cp. (33) in Appendix A. Note also that real wage increases
are passed on one for one to suppliers of wholesale goods. With full wage ﬂexibility, real wages
increase more pronouncedly. Since wage costs are passed on to the wholesale sector, period
proﬁts of ﬁrms which operate in the intermediate goods market can increase more sharply after
a monetary policy shock even though the wage increase is more pronounced than under rigid
wages. This contrasts with the eﬃcient-bargaining model used e.g. in Hall (2005). In the eﬃcient
wage bargaining model, rigid wages would translate into more ﬂuctuation in proﬁts than ﬂexible
wages. In our model, the increase of marginal costs in turn triggers a stronger response of inﬂation
compared to the benchmark model with rigid wages. Therefore, introducing wage rigidity in the
right-to-manage model smoothes wages as well as marginal cost so that the wage induced inertia
in marginal costs translates into more persistent inﬂation via the New Keynesian Phillips curve
similar to the mechanism mentioned in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005). In terms of
the response of unemployment, more ﬂexible wages yield a stronger fall of unemployment. In
23 A detailed description of all the counterfactual exercises can be found in Appendix E.
24 The red dotted line marked by triangles in Figure 1 shows the impulse responses when wage rigidity is eliminated.
Towards that aim, we set the wage adjustment cost parameter φ
new
L to zero.
29Figure 1: Impulse Responses to 1% Inﬂation Target Shock.
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Notes: The ﬁgures show percentage responses (1 in the plots corresponds to 1%) of endogenous variables
to a one percent increase in the inﬂation target. The black solid line marks the estimated model (at the
posterior mode). Black dotted lines mark 95% conﬁdence intervals (using 100.000 draws from the posterior
distribution). The red line marked by triangles shows the case of no wage rigidity. The remaining blue dashed
lines and the green dashed-dotted lines correspond to the counterfactual ﬂexible labor market experiments
described in more detail in Appendix E. Nb: an increase of unemployment of 1 in the plot means that the
unemployment rate increases by 1%, say from 0.15 to 0.1515; not by one percentage point!
30addition, unemployment appears to be somewhat less persistent than under a regime of rigid
wages.25
Additionally, Figure 1 shows another counterfactual exercise. We compare responses of variables
to an inﬂation target shock in the benchmark model to the one under a ﬂexible labor market
regime (see the dashed blue and dashed-dotted green lines in the ﬁgure). The labor market is less
rigid in the following sense: We assume that all searching workers immediately are matched with a
new employer in steady state, which corresponds to an abundance of ﬁrms in the market.26 We do,
however, retain the wage rigidity. Appendix E describes in detail how we implement this ﬂexible
labor market scenario. An increase in the inﬂation target decreases the real interest rate leading
to an increase in consumption. Hence period proﬁts rise and vacancies increase accordingly. In
a more ﬂexible labor market regime, labor market tightness is aﬀected more by movements in
unemployment. This in turn translates into larger movements in wages and also inﬂation than
in the rigid baseline. Therefore, we conclude that more rigid labor markets, especially when
rigidities lie on the wage side, lead to more persistent movements in inﬂation. This implies that
the transmission mechanism of monetary policy is inﬂuenced by the degree of rigidities in the
labor market – and that the latter are of ﬁrst-order importance for the way monetary policy needs
to be conducted.
In a second step, we look directly at shocks originating in the labor market. Towards that aim,
we proxy labor market impediments by the cost of vacancy posting. We analyze how a shock to
vacancy posting aﬀects the nominal and real variables in our model (see the solid black line in
Figure 2). In our simulations, a vacancy posting cost shock increases the cost of posting a vacancy
by 1%. Vacancy posting activity decreases and the job destruction rate remains constant by as-
sumption. Hence unemployment increases. Hours worked need to increase to satisfy consumption
demand. Consumption itself is aﬀected only slightly due to the estimate of strong habits and the
assumption of income pooling. Rising job creation costs mean higher barriers to entry and thus
higher rents from an existing employment relationship in the intermediate goods sector. This
25 Notice that due to income pooling the labor market dynamics do not translate into changes in the behavior of
consumption.
26 There will still be unemployment, however, since workers continue to start being productive only a period after
having been matched.
31leads to both a rise in wages and in the period proﬁts of each ﬁrm which already operates in the
market, and ultimately to a rise in inﬂation.
Figure 2 also shows the response of the variables to a vacancy posting cost shock under a ﬂexible
wage regime. An increase in vacancy posting costs depresses vacancy postings as before. Period
proﬁts of operating ﬁrms rise to a greater extent than in the baseline. Higher period proﬁts
in the intermediate goods sector in turn lead to higher wages and higher marginal costs which
translates into an increased response of inﬂation. Increased proﬁts of incumbent ﬁrms also mean
that vacancies experience a smaller drop and unemployment rises by less than in the benchmark.
Closely watching labor market developments could be important for monetary policy makers if
these developments ultimately have a non-negligible eﬀect on inﬂation and consumption, and on
potential output, and if the traditional New Keynesian variables are not suﬃcient statistics in
this respect. While a welfare-theoretic exploration is beyond the scope of this paper the following
provides a ﬁrst, and admittedly coarse, look at the importance of labor market shocks. The
variance decomposition in Table 6 shows how much of the forecast error variance in each variable
at diﬀerent forecast horizons is due to a speciﬁc set of innovations. Corroborating the variance
decomposition evidence in Table 6, we report actual error decompositions (after running the
Kalman smoother) at business cycle frequencies in Figure 3.
The vacancy posting cost shock is the key driving force of employment (87% in the short-run
and 63% in the long run) and vacancies (roughly 80% in the short and long-run). It is also an
important determinant for wages, hours worked and marginal cost (roughly 10% to 15% in the
short and long run) but with not enough transmission to let it matter for inﬂation or consumption.
As is apparent from Table 6 less than 5 percent of the variation of inﬂation, output and interest
rates is driven by the labor market shock. This result holds at all frequencies. We can conclude
that the impact of shocks to vacancy posting on the “traditional” New Keynesian nominal and
real variables of the model is rather limited.
Finally, still in Table 6 and Figure 3, we take a closer look at the labor market itself. We
see that besides the vacancy posting cost shock and the disutility of work shock, labor market
variables are especially inﬂuenced by technology and demand shocks. In contrast, the inﬂation
32Figure 2: Impulse Responses to 1% Vacancy Posting Cost Shock.
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Notes: The graphs show percentage responses (1 in the plots corresponds to 1%) of endogenous variables
to a one percent increase in vacancy posting costs. The black solid line marks the estimated model (at the
posterior mode). Black dotted lines mark 95% conﬁdence intervals (using 100.000 draws from the posterior
distribution). The red line marked by triangles shows the case of no wage rigidity. The remaining blue dashed
lines and the green dashed-dotted lines correspond to the counterfactual ﬂexible labor market experiments
described in more detail in Appendix E. Nb: an increase of unemployment of 1 in the plot means that the
unemployment rate increases by 1%, say from 0.15 to 0.1515; not by one percentage point!
33Table 6: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
Variable target demand pref. technology cost-push vacancy disutility lab.
Horizon 2
  yt 00.89 99.08 00.02 00.01 00.00 00.00
  rt 50.39 28.57 12.41 06.25 01.24 01.15
  πann
t 00.35 01.50 08.68 87.65 00.86 00.96
  nt 00.19 08.62 03.69 00.00 86.52 00.99
  wt 01.46 24.31 07.05 00.04 05.83 61.31
  xt 01.02 28.36 37.18 00.02 05.02 28.40
  ht 00.62 79.25 12.70 00.00 07.32 00.11
  vt 00.32 09.87 04.74 00.01 83.90 01.17
Horizon 10
  yt 03.25 93.59 02.72 00.13 00.18 00.13
  rt 17.55 37.84 38.21 02.14 02.50 01.77
  πann
t 01.60 04.34 43.01 45.41 03.16 02.48
  nt 01.62 15.80 14.53 00.07 65.97 02.02
  wt 04.97 30.03 16.81 00.24 15.20 32.74
  xt 03.26 24.15 44.33 00.16 11.02 17.08
  ht 01.48 69.45 13.11 00.05 14.90 01.03
  vt 00.57 09.99 06.13 00.02 82.09 01.20
Horizon 40
  yt 03.12 88.64 07.65 00.13 00.28 00.19
  rt 14.46 31.99 48.10 01.75 02.19 01.51
  πann
t 01.47 03.68 52.29 37.67 02.76 02.12
  nt 01.75 15.19 18.17 00.09 62.85 01.96
  wt 05.39 28.33 20.77 00.28 14.83 30.41
  xt 03.26 21.37 50.16 00.16 10.00 15.04
  ht 01.49 69.33 13.05 00.05 14.95 01.14
  vt 00.57 09.97 06.38 00.02 81.85 01.20
Notes: Forecast error variance demcoposition for three diﬀerent forecast horizons evaluated at the posterior
mode. From top to bottom: consumption, nominal interest rate, annual inﬂation, employment, real wage
rate, real marginal cost, hours worked, vacancies. From left to right: inﬂation target shock, demand (pref-
erence) shock, technology shock, cost-push shock, vacancy posting cost shock, disutility of work shock. All
entries are in %.
34Figure 3: Error Decomposition
Consumption Annual Inﬂation
1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003
−3
−2
−1
0
1
2
1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003
−2
−1
0
1
2
3
4
Nominal Rate Legend
1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
   
 
 
target
pref
tech
cost−p
vacancy
kappa
h
Employment Real Wage Rate
1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003
−1
0
1
2
3
1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003
−6
−4
−2
0
2
4
Notes: Business cycle error decomposition. After running the Kalman-
smoother the actual time series (orange line marked by circles) is decom-
posed into its contributing forces, i.e. into the contributions by each shock
process. Only every second observation is reported in order to keep the
graphs readable.
35target shock and the cost push shock are irrevelant for labor market ﬂuctuations.27 In general,
unsystematic monetary policy (i.e. the monetary policy shock) is not a suspect for being an
important determinant of ﬂuctuations in the labor market.
The Keynesian nature of our model becomes most apparent when examining the eﬀect of a positive
technology shock (see Figure 4). Hours worked fall as less labor input is required to produce the
demand determined output.28 This reinforces the increase in the marginal product of labor caused
by the technology shock. In addition, the marginal disutility of work falls, reducing the real wage
rate. Marginal costs fall driven by both the falling wage rate and the increased marginal product
of labor. Inﬂation falls accordingly. The associated interest rate reductions via the central bank
reaction function increase consumption gradually. Period proﬁts are tightly linked to the dynamics
in hours and wages; cp. equation (33) in Appendix A. Therefore, lower wages and hours come
along with lower proﬁts and hence reduced vacancy posting intensity.29 This causes a rise in
unemployment. The autocorrelated technology shock imposes a signiﬁcant degree of persistence
on the real and nominal variables.
In terms of the variance decomposition (cp. Table 6 and Figure 3 again), the technology shock
is a key determinant of marginal cost (determining 37% of its ﬂuctuations in the short and 50%
in the long run). Hence productivity ﬂuctuations in our model are very important for inﬂation,
determining 12% of its variability in the short-run and more than half in the long-run. In the long
run, technology also plays an important role for real wage and consumption ﬂuctuations. The
ﬁgures are 20% and 8%, respectively.
27 The inﬂation target shock is rather important for interest rate ﬂuctuations determining 50% of its ﬂuctuations
in the short run and 14% in the long run. The cost push shock mainly drives the inﬂation rate and hardly spills
over to other variables (apart from interest rates). It explains 88% of inﬂation variations in the short-run and
still 38% in the long-run; qualitatively similar to the results in Smets and Wouters (2003).
28 The response of hours worked to technology shocks recently has caused an intense discussion in the profession.
The fall of hours worked in response to a technology shock is in line with evidence reported in Gali (1999) and
Francis and Ramey (2002), for instance.
29 The response of vacancies is not hump-shaped. To achieve this Braun (2005) introduces vacancy adjustment costs
and Yashiv (2006) uses convex hiring costs. Fujita and Ramey (2005) modify the model in a more substantial
way. They add a job creation cost (a ﬁxed cost payable once which is not the same for each job) as opposed to
a vacancy posting cost (a cost payable each period the vacancy is open) to the model. Once a job is created,
posting a vacancy is costless. This makes vacancies a state variable. Since shocks are persistent there will be
new proﬁtable job opportunities in the next period. Thus vacancies continue to build up, leading to a more
sluggish (and hump-shaped) adjustment of vacancies. Yet the behavior of vacancies is not the main focus of our
paper, we therefore stick to the standard model.
36Figure 4: Impulse Responses to 1% Technology Shock.
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Notes: The graphs show percentage responses (1 in the plots corresponds to 1%) of endogenous variables to
a one percent technology shock. The black solid line marks the estimated model (at the posterior mode).
Black dotted lines mark 95% conﬁdence intervals (using 100.000 draws from the posterior distribution). The
red line marked by triangles shows the case of no wage rigidity. The remaining blue dashed lines and the
green dashed-dotted lines correspond to the counterfactual ﬂexible labor market experiments described in
more detail in Appendix E. Nb: an increase of unemployment of 1 in the plot means that the unemployment
rate increases by 1%, say from 0.15 to 0.1515; not by one percentage point!
37The demand preference shock stimulates current consumption (see Figure 5). The increased
demand requires additional labor input which initially is fully provided by an extension of hours
worked. Higher expected proﬁts translate into more vacancy posting and hence into an increase
in employment. The demand shock induces a positive correlation between all main variables as it
is found in the data (compare Table 9 in Appendix B for the cross correlations in the data).
Looking at the variance decomposition, it appears that the demand shock drives all consumption
movement in the short run and still 89% in the long run. It explains roughly 30% of real wage
movements and marginal cost. Yet as we have argued above there are other shocks, in particular
technology shocks, which have more inﬂuence on marginal cost and thus on inﬂation. The demand
shock is thus not a strong driving force of inﬂation: not more than 5% of the forecast error variance
of inﬂation are due to the demand shock.30
In brief, our results show that the labor market helps to understand the transmission of monetary
policy on inﬂation. Our counterfactual exercises display that the more rigid the labor market is,
and in particular the more rigid the real wage is, the more persistent is the response of inﬂation
to an inﬂation target shock. Moreover, we can show that labor market shocks transmit only
marginally into the dynamics of non-labor market variables in the model. A thorough welfare-
analysis notwithstanding, this may raise some doubt whether shocks originating in the labor
market are important information for monetary policy.
30 For the sake of brevity, we do not report impulse responses to price-markup and disutility of work shocks here.
These will be made available upon request.
38Figure 5: Impulse Responses to 1% Preference Shock.
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Notes: The graphs show percentage responses (1 in the plots corresponds to 1%) of endogenous variables
to a one percent preference shock. The black solid line marks the estimated model (at the posterior mode).
Black dotted lines mark 95% conﬁdence intervals (using 100.000 draws from the posterior distribution). The
red line marked by triangles shows the case of no wage rigidity. The remaining blue dashed lines and the
green dashed-dotted lines correspond to the counterfactual ﬂexible labor market experiments described in
more detail in Appendix E. Nb: an increase of unemployment of 1 in the plot means that the unemployment
rate increases by 1%, say from 0.15 to 0.1515; not by one percentage point!
396 Conclusions
In this paper we estimate a small-scale DSGE model with search and matching frictions by
Bayesian full-information techniques. We focus on a quantitative assessment of the role of la-
bor markets in a stable monetary policy regime. Towards that aim we use German data in order
to avoid possible problems with regard to the heterogeneity of labor market and monetary policy
regimes across the euro area in pre-EMU years.
To account for wage and inﬂation persistence we model quadratic wage adjustment costs in the
search and matching framework. Using a set of structural shocks including a labor market speciﬁc
shock we are able to present evidence on the relative importance of speciﬁc disturbances. Fur-
thermore we assess the role of labor market rigidities for monetary policy by counterfactual policy
simulations.
Our results can be summarized as follows. First, we ﬁnd that the structure of the labor market
matters substantially for the overall behavior of the economy and the transmission of monetary
policy on inﬂation in particular. The speciﬁc settings of the labor market, as for example the degree
of wage inertia or the eﬃciency of the matching process, are found to have a notable impact. The
inﬂuence of the labor market is stronger for inﬂation than for aggregate demand. Speciﬁcally, we
ﬁnd that the degree of wage rigidity is positively correlated with inﬂation persistence. In addition,
if the frictions associated with ﬁnding a new job are sizeable, our results show that the eﬀects of
shocks on inﬂation last longer. Furthermore we ﬁnd that a higher degree of wage rigidity ampliﬁes
real adjustment in the labor market and leads to more ﬂuctuations in employment.
Second, the realization of labor market shocks has an impact on the labor market itself but a
limited inﬂuence on the other blocks of the model. Therefore labor market shocks do not contribute
much to the cyclical dynamics of non-labor market variables – particularly inﬂation. This suggests
that the model does not feature much transmission from labor markets to the rest of the economy.
In our model, consumers perfectly insure each other against shortfalls of consumption due to
unemployment. Easing this assumption would likely introduce further transmission. In addition,
a further natural candidate for a change in the model structure is more closely tying price setting
40decisions to decisions in the labor market like hiring and wage setting.
In total, to the extent the European Central Bank’s task is to keep inﬂation low (and stable),
policy makers need to have a good understanding of the structure of the labor-market. The
realization of labor market speciﬁc shocks, however, to a ﬁrst (coarse) approximation does not
appear to contain much information for the conduct of monetary policy if its aim is to achieve
stable inﬂation and to stabilize output around its long-run trend.
Pointing to future research, this latter conclusion comes with the proviso that we leave aside one
important welfare-theoretic consideration: while labor market shocks may not alter actual output,
they can have a bearing on natural (ﬂex-price) or eﬃcient output, see e.g. Blanchard and Gali
(2005). This would in turn matter for the conduct of truely optimal monetary policy. We are
currently exploring this point in ongoing research.
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43A Linearized Model
A.1 Equations independent of the right-to-manage speciﬁcation
  λt =   rreal
t + Et  λt+1.
  λt = ǫ
pref
t −
σ
1 − hc
{  ct − hc  ct−1}.
This implies the Euler equation
  ct =
hc
1 + hc
  ct−1 +
1
1 + hc
Et  ct+1 −
1 − hc
σ(1 + hc)
  rreal
t +
1 − hc
σ(1 + hc)
(  ǫ
pref
t − Et  ǫ
pref
t+1 ).
  rreal
t =   Rt − Et  πt+1.
  yt =   nt +   zt + α  ht.
  mt = σ2  ut + (1 − σ2)  vt.
  st =   mt −   ut.
  qt =   mt −   vt.
  θt =   st −   qt =   vt −   ut.
  nt = (1 − ρ)  nt−1 + ρ  mt−1.
  ut = −(1 − ρ)
¯ n
¯ u
  nt.
  qt =   κt − (1 − β(1 − ρ))Et  λt+1 +
ρ
1 − ρ
Et  ρt+1 − (1 − β(1 − ρ))Et   ψt+1 + β(1 − ρ)Et {  qt+1 −   κt+1}.
  ψt =
1
ψ
 
xzh
α  
  xt +   zt + α  ht
 
− wh
 
  wt +   ht
  
.
  mplt =   zt + (α − 1)  ht.
  mrst =   κht + φ  ht −   λt.
  Rt = ρ  Rt−1 + (1 − ρ)γπ(  πt+1|t −   πt) + (1 − ρ)γy  yt.
  πt =
β
1 + βγ
Et  πt+1 +
γ
1 + βγ
  πt−1 +
(1 − ϕ)(1 − ϕβ)
ϕ(1 + βγ)
(  xt +   et).
  et =
1
1 − ǫ
  ǫ
cp
t .
44A.2 First-order conditions of bargaining with right-to-manage
A.2.1 Hours
  xt +   mplt =   wt.
implying
  xt +   zt + (α − 1)  ht =   wt.
Note also that for right-to-manage bargaining31
  ψt =   wt +   ht. (33)
A.2.2 Real wage rate
  wt = ξ1  χt + γ1   mrst + γ2(  κt +   θt −   λt −   ht) − γ3  ht − ξ2Et  χt+1. (34)
ξ1 =
1
1 −
χ
α
 
χ
 
1
α
+
κθ
λhw
−
mrs
w(1 + φ)
−
b
hw
 
+
χ
1 − χ
 
κ
λqhw
(1 − s)
  
.
ξ2 =
1
1 −
χ
α
 
(1 − s)
κ
λqhw
χ
1 − χ
 
.
γ1 =
1
1 −
χ
α
 
mrs
w(1 + φ)
(1 − χ)
 
.
γ2 =
1
1 −
χ
α
 
χ
κθ
λhw
 
.
γ3 =
1
1 −
χ
α
 
(1 − χ)
b
hw
 
.
  χt = (1 − χ)
 
  δ
w,w
t −   δ
f,w
t
 
.
  δ
w,w
t =   ht −
mrs
w
α − mrs
w
(  mrst −   wt).
  δ
f,w
t =   ht +
w
h
φL
 
(  wt −   wt−1) − β(1 − ρ)(  wt+1|t −   wt)
 
.
We deﬁne φnew
L := w
h φL/1000.
31 Using the deﬁnition of proﬁts and the FOC for hours,
ψt + adj. costs = xtzth
α
t − wtht = xtmplt
ht
α
− wtht = wtht
￿
1 − α
α
￿
.
Since adjustment costs have no ﬁrst-order eﬀect on proﬁts, in equilibrium proﬁts are tightly linked to the total
wage bill.
45B Data
Table 7: Data Description and Sources
Price level Consumer price index, CPI all items,
base year 2000, own seasonal adjustment.
Source: OECD.
Nominal interest rate 3-month money market interest rate, interbank market.
Frankfurt, monthly average, % p.a.
Source: OECD.
Vacancies Unﬁlled job vacancies, seasonally adjusted,
Quantum (non-additive or stock ﬁgures), in 1000. persons
Source: OECD.
Consumption Private ﬁnal consumption expenditure, GDP by expenditure,
quarterly levels, 1995 prices, seasonally adjusted.
Source: OECD.
Labor force Total labor force, in 1000 persons, own seasonal adjustment.
Source: OECD.
Employment Civilian employment (survey), seasonally adjusted,
all persons, all ages, in 1000 persons.
Source: OECD.
Wages Hourly earnings: manufacturing, index publication base,
base year 2000, seasonally adjusted.
Source: OECD.
Hours Hours of work total industry, excluding construction,
seasonally adjusted.
Source: Eurostat.
46Figure 6: Plots of the Detrended and Demeaned Series
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Notes: Data used as log-deviations from a respective trend (see below). The inﬂation series marks annual
(year on year) inﬂation as log-deviations from a respective trend. The data span 1977:1 to 2004:2. All series
are multiplied by 100 in order to give percentage deviations from steady state. The trends and constants
have been computed using data from 1984:3 to 2004:2. Log consumption was regressed on a constant, a
reuniﬁcation dummy and a linear trend. Log employment rates were demeaned and detrended. Vacancies
were computed as vact := (V act − mean(V act))/mean(V act) and hence not detrended. Log real wage rates
were regressed on a constant and a linear trend. Log hours worked were demeaned and detrended. Inﬂation
rates were demeaned and linear detrended. The interest rate was demeaned and linear detrended.
47Table 8: Standard Deviation and Persistence
Names std sum1 sum2 sum3 sum4 sum5
  rt 0.4368 0.9734 0.9606 0.9551 0.9398 0.9376
  yt 1.7292 0.7999 0.8605 0.8328 0.8329 0.7819
  vt 30.0150 0.9561 0.9598 0.9565 0.9510 0.9520
  nt 1.0887 0.9062 0.8797 0.9347 0.9035 0.8753
  wt 2.2260 0.9296 0.9200 0.9065 0.9249 0.9205
  ht 5.3275 0.8593 0.8867 0.9139 0.9139 0.8944
  πann
t 1.3228 0.9335 0.9176 0.9114 0.8963 0.9246
Notes: “sum1” is the ﬁrst-order autoregression coeﬃcient (OLS), “sum2” is
the sum of the ﬁrst two autoregression coeﬃcients (OLS) and so forth. “Std”
is the standard deviation of the time series. The data span 1984:3 to 2004:2.
Table 9: Cross-correlations
Names   rt   yt   vt   nt   wt   ht   πann
t
  rt 1.0000 0.4755 0.3578 0.7658 0.4866 0.7403 0.8506
  yt · 1.0000 0.5185 0.7146 0.5948 0.4937 0.2374
  vt · · 1.0000 0.4891 0.3395 0.3863 0.1383
  nt · · · 1.0000 0.4772 0.7972 0.4833
  wt · · · · 1.0000 0.4748 0.3676
  ht · · · · · 1.0000 0.4772
  πann
t · · · · · · 1.0000
Notes: Cross-correlations of the data computed from 1984:3 to 2004:2.
48C Further Estimation Statistics for the Parameters
Table 10: Summary Statistics for Estimated Parameters
Parameter prior posterior
mean std distr. mean median mode 95% conf. interval
Parameters of Structural Model
ρm 0.750 0.0500 norm 0.80 0.80 0.78 0.73 0.86
γπ 1.500 0.3000 norm 1.46 1.45 1.40 1.01 1.92
γy 0.125 0.3000 norm 0.21 0.21 0.19 0.10 0.34
hc 0.850 0.0500 norm 0.83 0.84 0.83 0.77 0.89
ϕ 0.900 0.0500 norm 0.93 0.93 0.92 0.90 0.95
γp 0.300 0.1000 norm 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.14 0.41
σ2 0.400 0.0500 norm 0.33 0.33 0.31 0.23 0.43
φnew
L 0.250 0.1000 norm 0.37 0.37 0.36 0.27 0.47
Serial Correlation of Shocks
ρ¯ π 0.300 0.2000 norm 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.17 0.55
ρκ 0.700 0.1000 norm 0.60 0.61 0.60 0.49 0.72
ρz 0.900 0.0250 norm 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.88 0.98
ρκh 0.300 0.1000 norm 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.05 0.36
Standard Deviation of Innovations
 ¯ π 0.007 Inf invg 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.004
 pref 0.100 Inf invg 0.074 0.072 0.068 0.048 0.105
 z 0.006 Inf invg 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.002 0.007
 cost−push 0.001 Inf invg 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.004
 κ 0.010 Inf invg 0.028 0.028 0.025 0.016 0.043
 κh 0.200 0.1000 norm 0.443 0.443 0.435 0.336 0.553
Notes: Parameter estimates using 100.000 draws (after burn in) in the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. Nota
bene: The underlying calibration is such that q = 0.7391, s = 0.4928, wh/y = α = 0.72, κ/
￿
λy
￿
= 1.4771,
b/
￿
wh
￿
= 0.5, u = 0.15 and v = 0.1.
49D Cross-correlation
Figure 7 compares model cross-correlations to the cross-correlations measured in the data. those
of the data. The black solid line marks model cross-correlations (evaluated at the posterior mode,
again). The black dash-dotted lines mark 95% coverage intervals. The ﬁgure also shows VAR(2)
cross-correlations (read and dotted) as a data summary. These are framed by dotted blue 95%
bootstrapped conﬁdence intervals from the VAR. Overall, the model’s cross-correlations match the
data’s well – especially the autocorrelation properties. Still, a few properties are not matched by
our model to which we turn next: First, the correlation between consumption and interest rates is
not yet suﬃciently positive (row 1, column 2; row 2, column 1). Second, in the data consumption
is a predictor for future inﬂation. Our model does not match this fact (row 1, column 3; row 3,
column 1). Presumably, these correlations could be brought closer to the data by a more judicious
choice of the monetary policy rule. In our model, the monetary authority is the only sector which
is not optimizing. In principle that leaves many degrees of freedom for modelling the interest rate
reaction function. However, more sophisticated (performance oriented, say) policy rules may tend
to overﬁt – making policy-analysis on the basis of the model a dubious task. We prefer to stick
to the parsimonious Taylor rule. Third, both employment and the real wage are not suﬃciently
positively correlated with future output (rows 4 and 5, column 1).
E Flexible Labor Market Experiments
The impulse responses (Figures 1, 2, 4 and 5) show the estimated benchmark model along with
counterfactual scenarios that are meant to illustrate the behaviour of the economy if the labor
market were more ﬂexible. In detail, they are constructed as follows:
1. A black solid line marks the impulse response when the estimated parameters (at the
posterior mode) are used along with the baseline calibration.
2. A red dotted line marked by triangles shows the impulse responses when the estimated
parameters of the model are used but for eliminating wage rigidity. We set the latter to a
very small value, φnew
L = 1.e − 6. This case shows how important the wage rigidity friction
is. Clearly, the steady state relative to the estimated model is not changed by altering φnew
L .
3. A green dash-dotted line without markers shows the response when the estimated
parameters of the model are used but the labor market is less rigid in the following sense:
We assume that all workers almost immediately ﬁnd a job in steady state (not necessarily
outside of steady state) – this means there is an abundance of ﬁrms in the market. We set
the probability of ﬁnding a job in steady state to about 1, s ≈ 1, and the probability for a
ﬁrm to ﬁnd a worker close to zero, q ≈ 0.
• This changes the steady state of the model.
• In order to achieve these changes, vacancy posting costs need to be negligible, κ ≈
0. The eﬃciency of matching, σm, needs to be adjusted to guarantee well deﬁned
probability measures in steady state.
50Figure 7: Cross-Correlations.
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Notes: Cross-correlation vs data (VAR2). The black solid line marks the cross-correlation of the model
at the posterior mode (or, it turns out after the simulations, almost equivalently the median cross-
correlation). The black dash-dotted lines mark corresponding 95% posterior coverage intervals (over the
median). The red dashed line marks cross-correlations obtained from a VAR(2) without constants. Blue
dots mark a 95% conﬁdence interval (over the median) obtained from bootstrapping the same VAR(2)
without constant.
51• We maintain the assumption that the marginal rate of substitution equals the wage
rate in steady state, mrs
w = 1, and that hours worked h = 1/3. These assumptions are
satisﬁed by means of a change in the disutility of work scaling parameter, κh, and the
level of unemployment beneﬁts, b, relative to the estimated model.
• This leads to a replacement rate b
wh = 0.15 instead of 0.5. Note that for each worker,
unemployment becomes less costly (as he is sure to ﬁnd a job next period), the replace-
ment rate therefore needs to fall.
• With s ≈ 1, there is about full employment prior to production, so the number of
searching workers is u = ρ, which is another change to the steady state.
4. A blue dashed line without markers is the same as in 3. but that we in addition assume
a smaller separation rate, ρ = 0.07. This implies
• a replacement rate of b
wh = 0.05 instead of 0.5.
5. A green dash-dotted line marked by circles is the same as in 3. but for the fact that
we let only the eﬃciency of matching, σm, change relative to the benchmark (to achieve
a well deﬁned probability measure) and let only vacancy posting costs, κ, change keeping
unemployment beneﬁts, b, and the scaling parameter to disutility of work, κh, (and all
preference parameters) at the level as in the estimated version.
• This leads to the steady state not being eﬃcient anymore mrs
w = 0.90.
• u = 0.08.
• h = 0.33.
• b
wh = 0.51., which is about the same replacement rate as in the benchmark case.
6. A blue dashed line marked by circles is the same as in 5. but for the fact that we also
assume ρ = 0.07.
• This leads to the steady state not being eﬃcient anymore mrs
w = 0.89.
• u = 0.07.
• h = 0.33.
• b
wh = 0.51.
52F Nominal Wage Adjustment Costs and Calvo Wage Rigidity
As a robustness check we entertained two further variants for modelling wage rigidity:
1. we examined whether modelling adjustment costs on nominal instead of real wages alters
the behavior of the model in a signiﬁcant manner.
2. we entertained a Calvo (1983) staggered framework to give an economic meaning to the size
of the adjustment cost estimate φnew
L .
Our results, ﬁrst, are not sensitive to the way we modelled wage rigidity. Second, the quadratic
wage adjustment cost estimate in the benchmark model translates into moderate Calvo wage
stickiness. Wages according to our estimates are reoptimized twice a year.
Ad 1. when we assume that adjusting nominal wages causes costs – not the adjustment of the real
wage rate – instead of (18) we let proﬁts be characterized by
ψt(j) := xtyI
t(j) − wt(j)ht(j) −
1
2
φL
 
wt(j)
wt−1(j)
Πt
Π
− 1
 2
. (35)
Overall, the behaviour of the economy is very similar to the economy under real wage adjustment
costs and so are the posterior mode parameter estimates. The only diﬀerence appears in the
response of the economy to a cost-push shock. We omit the ﬁgure here for brevity and refer to
our IZA discussion paper No. 1902, p. 55, Figure 10.
Ad 2. we also experimented with Calvo type real wage rigidities at the individual ﬁrm/worker
level instead of the quadratic adjustment costs.32 We keep the assumption of right-to-manage
bargaining. That is, in each period the ﬁrm decides on the intensive margin (hours worked)
taking into account the prevailing individual wage rate. In contrast to Gertler and Trigari (2005),
who use eﬃcient bargaining, we can therefore retain the intensive margin (hours choice). Let γw
be the probability that a ﬁrm-worker pair cannot update its wage. Instead of the wage equation
(34) the Calvo model features the (mostly auxiliary) equations listed below.
Parameter estimates are very similar to the version with quadratic adjustment costs – we therefore
do not report them here. The slope of wage adjustment costs, φnew
L estimated for the benchmark
model under quadratic adjustment costs translates to a Calvo wage stickiness of γw = 0.5 at the
posterior mode. So wages are reset twice a year.
[ Gap1t =
1 − β(1 − ρ)(1 − s)
1 − ˜ β
1
φ
1+φ − b
wh
 
  w∗
t−1 −   wt−1
 
, (36)
32 This implies full indexation of wages to inﬂation as is frequently found in the aggregate data; see e.g. Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), who ﬁnd full indexation for US data, and Smets and Wouters (2003), who ﬁnd
substantial indexation for euro area data.
53where ˜ β = β(1 − ρ)γw.
[ Gap1t =
1 − β(1 − ρ)(1 − s)
1 − ˜ β
1
φ
1+φ − b
wh
(  wt−1 −   w∗
t). (37)
  WUt =
1−β(1−ρ)(1−s)
φ
1+φ− b
wh
 
  w∗
t + 1
1+φ
 
  λt −   κh,t
  
+β(1 − ρ)(1 − s)Et   WUt+1
+β(1 − ρ)(1 − s)
 
  λt+1 −   λt
 
+ ˜ β(1 − s)Et [ Gap2t+1
+˜ βEt [ Gap1t+1 − β(1 − ρ)s  st.
(38)
  Jt =
1−β(1−ρ)
α−1 (α  w∗
t −   zt −   xt)
+
˜ β
1−˜ β
 
1−γw
γw + 1 − β(1 − ρ)
  
Et  λt+1 −   λt
 
+
˜ β
γwEt   Jt+1
+
˜ β
1−˜ β(1 − β(1 − ρ)) α
α−1
 
  w∗
t − Et   w∗
t+1
 
.
(39)
Wage bargaining FOC
  WUt =   δW
t +   Jt −   δF
t . (40)
  δW
t =
1−˜ β
(α−1)
 
1 +
α−1−φ
α−1
 
  w∗
t
−
1−˜ β
(α−1)2(α − 1 − φ)(  xt +   zt)
+
1−˜ β
α−1
 
  λt −   κh,t
 
+˜ β
 
Et  λt+1 −   λt
 
+˜ β
1+(α−1−φ)/(α−1)
α−1
 
  w∗
t − Et   w∗
t+1
 
+˜ βEt  δW
t+1.
(41)
  δF
t =
1−˜ β
α−1 (  w∗
t −   xt −   zt) +
˜ β
α−1
 
  w∗
t − Et   w∗
t+1
 
+ ˜ β
 
Et  λt+1 −   λt
 
+ ˜ βEt  δF
t+1. (42)
Aggregate wage
  wt = γw   wt−1 + (1 − γw)  w∗
t. (43)
Vacancy Posting
  Jt =
1−β(1−ρ)
α−1 (α  w∗
t −   zt −   xt)
+(1 − ρ)β
 
  κt −   λt −   qt
 
+
˜ β
1−˜ β(1 − β(1 − ρ)) α
α−1 (  w∗
t −   wt).
(44)
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